Research — Project

Political Disenchantment and the Learning Challenge

Triptych of young protesters holding hand-lettered signs referencing Gen Z activism in 2025

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The 2025 Generation Z Protest Wave

At first glance, Nepal, Madagascar and Peru share little beyond their location outside the West. In the autumn of 2025 they shared something else: Each became the scene of what is now called a Generation Z protest — uprisings led by young people born roughly between the late 1990s and the early 2010s, producing seismic shifts that in some cases ended in systemic political collapse and regime transition. In September 2025, Nepali youth mobilizing against a government ban on social media stormed the parliament in Kathmandu and brought down the government. A month later, disillusioned young people filled the streets of Antananarivo and forced Madagascar's president into exile. In the same season, Peruvian youth rallied openly against rampant crime and corruption, removed a president from office, and kept mobilizing against her successor.

The wave is wider than three capitals. From Mali to Morocco, Mozambique to Mexico, Bangladesh to Botswana, Indonesia to Iran, large-scale youth-led movements have seized the spotlight, demanding democratic change amid political and economic turmoil. Against a global surge of authoritarianism, young people have taken to smartphones and encrypted applications to fight corruption, democratic backsliding, inequality and, in many settings, the absence of work. These movements have been largely leaderless: Dynamic, decentralized, ignited by spontaneous mobilization on platforms and sustained by the communicative forms — memes, livestreams, shared symbols — that gave them continuity. Nor is the repertoire confined to fragile states. Youth in consolidated democracies such as France and Italy have adopted the same digital dissent mechanisms to voice their concerns and demand change.

EMBERS: Exit, voice, radicalization

Dramatic red-lit portrait of a young man in glasses biting down on a metal chain, straining against it

EMBERS is a proposal at an early stage. Our concern is threefold: To identify the research questions, to give reasons for them, and to review where the best research worldwide stands. What follows is a working premise.

The name carries it. An ember is generational energy in its latent state. It can be captured by extremist entrepreneurs and flare into violence. That is the radicalization problem the proposal starts from. It can be smothered by disengagement, cynicism and exit. That is the quieter loss European surveys now record as falling youth interest in democratic participation. Or it can be banked and tended until it warms the institutions of democratic life. That is the possibility the 2025 protest wave puts on the table.

We assume these are not three separate phenomena. They are three outlets for the same affective, mediated, generational energy. Which outlet prevails depends on the channels a society offers its young. Hirschman's triad of exit, voice and loyalty is our candidate lens. It gives a first hypothesis: Radicalization is what happens when voice is blocked, exit is foreclosed, and loyalty has nothing left to attach to. If that holds, the lesson for Europe is direct: Evolve, empower and engage the young, and democratic resilience is strengthened at its root.

The EU is not a secluded communication sphere. It sits inside a global field of political communication. The same platform architectures operate inside the Union. So do the same algorithms shaping adolescent attention, and the same grievances over blocked futures and distrusted institutions. Stronger welfare states and older democracies refract them. They do not remove them. Populism, democratic backsliding and digital disinformation are documented. Two questions follow. What role could a media-literate and digitally literate youth play in keeping authoritarianism out of Europe? And what does Europe risk if a generation concludes that voice inside institutions is futile?

The Union has begun to build a policy answer. The European Democracy Action Plan addressed disinformation and election integrity. The 2023 Defence of Democracy package reinforced it. The European Media Freedom Act (2024) protects media pluralism and independence. The European Democracy Shield (2025) commits the Union to countering disinformation, strengthening information integrity in election campaigns, enhancing societal resilience and boosting citizen engagement.

This architecture still seems to lack a generational theory and an evidence base. It regulates information environments. It does not yet explain the conditions under which young Europeans choose voice over exit, and engagement over capture. Nor does it cultivate them. Whether EMBERS can supply that layer is what the research questions must test. We see the Democracy Shield's citizen-engagement pillar as a primary policy interface, alongside the EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation.

What EMBERS asks

The integration of the voice agenda sharpens the project's questions.

RQ1 — Through what affective, mediated and institutional mechanisms does generational energy flow toward radicalization, toward disengagement, or toward democratic voice — and what tips the balance?

RQ2 — To what extent, and under what conditions, does media and digital literacy foster and enhance youth-led democratic engagement in Europe, making European societies more resilient against authoritarianism, populist capture and disinformation?

RQ3 — How can society's baseline institutions — family, community, school, police and law, the workplace, sports and religion — be configured as mitigative arenas that offer credible channels of voice rather than mere mechanisms of protection?

RQ4 — What does the 2025 Generation Z protest conjuncture, read comparatively from Kathmandu to Lima and from Antananarivo to Paris, teach European prevention and engagement policy?